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Stanley Surrey, the 1981 US Model, and the Single Tax
Principle
Reuven Avi-Yonah • & Gianluca Mazzoni ..

2021 marh tlx fortieth annwmary of the 1981 VS Modd Tax Treaty a, well a, th, fifth anniwr;ary of tht 2016 US Modd Tax Truty, Tix
fim a,ahar har reprattdly arg11fd that tht 1981 l\I(}(Ul gdl>e life to tht single tax prindpk ('STP'}. The 2016 Modd updaw ef{<ftfrely
impkmmtd tht principle that ;r()JJ-lx.wtkr ini:otm 1hoK!d ht /,sxffi once - that iJ 1101 mort and but a/Jo not Im than rmre. Fw =smpu, 1h, 2016
Mo,:k/ does 1101 rtdsm u•ithholding taxn on paymmts of highly mobik inc01'/t that art matk to rtlattd pmom that enjoy lou or no taxalion with
m/J(ct to that inw"" 11ndu a preferrntial tax rtgime. Th, aim of thiJ article is to idmtify with rdati1>e cmainty the origins of the STP. The
pu,pou iJ to gfre a systematic and hiJtorual fawprttation of the STP by looking at th, rontext during u•hich it was p11rpm-ttdiy f0Jt11dd. This
article drau� ex/m,il!dy on publishtd and unpKblishtd writi ng1 of the main archite,:t of VS inlmiational tax mies, Stanky Surny, and i, the
mult of arrhi,,a/ raearch wndNctd al the HiJtorical & Spt,:ial Colkr:tions of Hariw·d Lau, School Library. Th, aim of thiJ artick is to 1hou•
that the origi11s of the STP, from tlx J,mjltCtive of the Vniud StattJ as a WIim crmntry, calf ht trac.d to tfx eight-year period from 1 % 1 to 1969
when SlllrtJ, a Harvard law profmor (1950-1984) became thi Jim VS AHiJtant Stcrttary of tk Treauny for Tax Policy. A, far as tax
treatitJ an am=d, Surrty made tu'Q major contriblltiom to applying the STP in practic;. First, th. tax treatie:r negotiaud by Sumy: (1) tlx
LJ/xnnlxmrg�Unittd Stater Imo= and Capital Tax Trtaty (1962), (2) the 1963 protorol to the treaty u'ith tfx Ntthtrla11d, applicahk to tk
Netkrlami, A111iltt1, and (3) 1he Canada-United StaW Im·o,m Tax Treaty (1966) took paim to mfon·e sourre-bastd taxation in caseJ whert
there um ,w midma-ba;,d taxation ofpassfrt ilurmie. Serond, it was dKring S11rrry's tinu at the US Treas11ry D,partmmt that the US tkl,gation
wrote two now to the OECD Fiual Committte rtt:011111ttnding th, establishmtnt of a nm, \f'orking Group u'hich would addrm the problem efTax
Awidana through the Improper Use or Abme of Tax Com>enti011s. Thi, article diK11sm Surrey's rontrihutiom Iii the practical impk-111mtation of
t!xSTP.
Keyword<l Tu hiuory, mnley Sunry, ;, model tu trnty, ,ingle ru: principk.

INTRODUCTION

payments of highly mobile income that are made to
related persons that enjoy low or no taxation with respect
to that income under a preferential tax regime.
The aim of this article is to identify with relative
certainty the origins of the STP. The purpose is to give
a systematic and historical interpretation of the STP by
looking at the context during which ir was purportedly
founded. This article draws extensively on published and
unpublished writings of the main architect of US inter
national tax rules, Stanley Surrey, and is the result of
archival research conduaed at the Historical & Special
Collections of Harvard Law School Library. The aim of
this article is to show that the origins of the STP, from the
perspeaive of the United Stares as a source country, can
be traced to the eight-year period from 1961 to 1969

2021 marks the forth anniversary of the 1981 US Model
Tax Treaty as well as the fifth anniversary of the 2016 US
Model Tax Treaty. The first author has repeatedly argued
that the 1981 Model gave life to the single tax principle
('STP'), because it denied treaty benefits (reduaion of
withholding taxes) to income that was not fully taxed in
1
the residence jurisdietion. This provision disappeared
from the 1996 and 2006 versions of the US Model, but
resurfaced in expanded form in the 2016 version. The
2016 Model updates effectively implemented the princi
ple that cross-border income should be taxed once - that
is not more and but also not less than once. For example,
the 2016 Model does not reduce withholding taxes on

Irwin I Cohn pro&-sso, of Low, ,� Uni>=ity of Michigan. Em,,il: 11vi,o,,ohli!'umich,cdu.
•• SJD, tht Unim>itr of Micbigtn. Email: gtD.HtO<ti@umicb.edu.
1

R. S. Avi-Yonth, Who 1-,J tbt Siqu T.,x Pri,cipk? A• lltS4J 911 ti,, Him,ry ef US T""'J Polity, 59 NYLS L. lleY. 305 (2015). S• ,,{Ja R.. S. A..;.y-h, F•fl Cirru? Tht
Siqµ T,v,; Prill<i/h, BEPS, """ th, N,w US M,J,/, I Global Tax'n 12 (2016}. The hi.=rkal origins of the STP arc mudi old«, dtuins back IX> the US adoprion of the foreign
mx crcdic(inscz,,d of an aemption) in 1918 and ,o the W<Xk of the la&ut of Nations in dw, 1920s. S.. G. Ma:aoni, p...,,.,a, du Crutio,,: Nd,;.,,./ RDMrd,,mJ E.,;Jn,a.,. tht
Orifi�, of tb, Si,,,;u T,rx l'ri1«itlr, 47(l0) lnttttn 813 (2019).
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l nterta.x
structure was similar to that of Germany and the
Netherlands. All three countries taxed the global income
of an operating corporation having a domestic seat of
management but made special provision for intercompany
dividends . Each country exempted from tax a dividend
received by a domestic corporation from a domestic sub
sidiary in which the recipient held a 'substantial interest'
(defined in each country as 2 5 % of the stock of the
subsidiary). However, only the Netherlands then
exempted from tax dividends from a foreign subsidiary
in which a domestic parent held a 'substantial interest'. A
non.resident shareholder (corporate or individual) was
subject to withholding tax on dividends from an operat
ing corporation under the laws of each of these three
countries .
Duri ng the 1962 negotiations with Luxembourg, the
Luxembourg delegation expressed concern that the d raft
of Article XV proposed by the United States would have
denied reduced treaty rares of tax on dividends received by
a Luxembourg operating corporation from a US corpora
t ion in which it held a 'substantial interest' in the event
that Luxembourg should have amended its laws to extend
the exemption privilege to d ividends received from a
foreign subsidiary . When the US delegation asserted
that this would have been the case, the proposed draft
was termed 'unacceptable' by Luxembourg .
Telegram no. 978, dated 2 October 1 962 , from Walter
Cecil Dowling , US Am bassador to West Germany from
1 95 9 to 1 96 3 , to the US Secretary of State well described
the situation:

when Surrey, a Harvard law professor ( 1 9 5 0-1 984)
became the first US Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy. As far as tax treaties are concerned, Surrey
made two major contributions to applyi ng the STP i n
practice. First, the tax treaties negotiated by Surrey: ( 1 )
the Luxembourg-United States Income and Capital Tax
Treaty ( 1 962), (2) the 1 963 protocol to the treaty with the
Netherlands applicable to the Netherlands Antilles, and
(3) the Canada-United States Income Tax Treaty (1 966)
took pains to enforce source-based taxation in cases where
there was no residence-based taxation of passive income.
Second, it was during Surrey's time at the US Treasury
Department that the US Delegation wrote two notes to
the OECD Fiscal Committee recommending the estab
lishment of a new Working Group which would address
the problem of Tax Avoidance through the Improper Use
or Abuse of Tax Conventions. This article discusses
Surrey's contributions tO rhe practical implementation of
the STP.

2

LUXEMBOURG

The first US treaty which had some indication that double
non-taxation of US source income was inappropriate was
the treaty with Luxembourg, concluded in 1 962, which
precluded the application of reduced US wi thholding rares
to certain Luxembourgian holding corporations that were
not subject to tax on a residence basis.
A memorandum from Mr McGreevy to Mr Surrey
dated 19 October 1 962 helps us in reconstructing the
original intent of the 1 962 treaty with Luxembourg .
The Luxembourg i ncome tax treaty was signed at 1 2
noon o n 1 8 December 1 962 a t the US State Department.
The signatories were Mr Rusk (US) and the Luxembourg
Ambassador to the United States acting on behalf of the
Heads of State of each country. The signing ceremony was
open to the public and held in the Diplomatic Reception
Room in the New State Building, 7th floor, opposite the
Secretary's office. The negotiations of the Luxembourg
treaty were overseen by Surrey with the help of Mr
Tillinghast , Mr Gordon and Mr McGreevy .
Article XV of the 1 962 tax convention with
Luxembourg was directed primari ly at Luxembourg 'hold
ing companies' as defined under then exmmg
Luxembourg law. Such companies were exempt from
income, property and trade taxes on their d ividend i ncome
from all sources provided that they did not engage in
trade or busi ness. In addition, nonresident shareholders
(corporate and individual) were not subject to
Luxembourg tax on i ncome from a Luxembourg holdi ng
company. Article XV rendered the provisions of the tax
convention inapplicable to income of Luxembourg 'hold
i ng companies' or to income derived therefrom by thei r
shareholders.
At that time, Luxembourg did not grant sim ilar bene
fits to operating companies. The Luxembourg income tax

Agreement not yet reached with Luxembourg, US pro
posal for modification of Article XV (holding compa•
nies) of Draft Convention as contai ned in Gordon letter
to Schaus August 6, 1 962 not acceptable to
Luxembourg. Their argument was that language too
broad and might deny benefits of treaty to any operat•
ing Luxembourg corporation exempted from tax on
dividends from a foreign subsidiary or on other income
from foreign sources such as sales income. Such exemp•
tion not now granted but Luxembourg may want to
change its laws to do so. Acceptance of Luxembourg
proposal would mean US acquiescence in a new "Swiss
tax haven." New US alternative being considered by
Luxembourg. Expect their reaction Thursday.
McGreevy returni ng Washington Monday or Tuesday.
Hope t o have agreed draft then.
Because of pressures for immediate agreement on a tax
convention with Luxembourg, the US delegation proposed
to add a new sentence to the draft of Article XV, which
was deemed acceptable to Luxembourg:
The expression "substantially similar benefit" shall be
deemed not to include tax reduction or exemption
granted to any corporation in respect of dividends
derived from another corporation, 25 percent or more
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of the stock of which is owned by the recipient
corporation.

The Luxembourg delegation was well aware of the
attitude of the United States regarding the use of tax
treaties by its treaty partners to enhance their reputations
as tax havens. Perhaps the chief restraint against prospec
tive legislation by Luxembourg to permit treaty abuses
was the power of the United States to terminate the tax
convention. It may be that the five-year interval imposed
by Article XIII before this power might have been exer
cised uni laterally was too long under the circumstances.
However, in view of Luxembourg's desire for a US tax
convention, it seemed reasonable to assume it would have
adhered to the spirit as well as the letter of the agreement.
In summary, the 1 962 treaty with Luxembourg was the
first one where the US adopted a so-called 'preferential
tax treatment' approach according to which certain con
vention benefits are denied to any entity which by virtue
of 'special measm·es' is subject to taxation on the bene
fited i ncome at rates substantially lower than those gen
erally applicable in the State in which the entity is
organized, if the entity is owned tO a substantial extent
by persons not entitled to the benefits of the convention.
After 1962, subsequent provisions generally were drafted
along the following lines:

This last sentence in effect provided that the tax conven
tion would have applied even though Luxembourg law
exempted from all taxes dividends received by a
Luxembourg operati ng corporation from a US corporation
in which it held at least 2 5 % of the stock.
Article XV clearly denied reduced treaty rates on divi
dends received by an operating corporation on its portfolio
i nvestments (less than 2 5 % hold ings) if Luxembourg law
subsequently were amended to exempt such income from
tax or if the domestic tax rate on such income were
substantially reduced. If Luxembourg law should have
later provided that dividends received by a non-resident
shareholder from a Luxembourg operating corporation
were exempt from tax, then the United States should
have been free to mai ntain that reduced treaty rates for
d ividends from US sources were inapplicable with respect
to such a corporation si nce the amendment relating to the
Luxembourg withholding rate of tax on shareholders was
'substantially similar' to a benefit conferred under the
holding company laws and no exception was provided
for this type of benefit under Article XV.
The concession made to Luxembourg was intended to
be restricted to the hypothetical presented. Moreover, the
Luxembourg delegation insisted that there were no plans
then to extend tax exemption to dividends received from a
foreign subsidiary. It was bel ieved that such a change in
Luxembourg should have not caused undue embarrass
ment to Treasury in view of the fact that sim ilar provi
sions in Dutch and Canadian law had nor prompted
special recognmon in US tax treaties with the
Netherlands or Canada . The drafr of Article XV actually
had gone further than a comparable provision imposed by
Germany in its treaty wi th Luxembourg in that it would
have applied to portfol io income of an operating company
to which holding company benefits were conferred. The
potential for abuses in the event of such a change appeared
to be li mited , particularly when the Luxembourg corpora
tion had US shareholders. Distributions to US share
holders would have been taxable in the United States
and the exemption from Luxembourg tax on the corpora
tion's dividend i ncome would have reduced the foreign
tax credit claimed there. Accumulations of the dividend
i ncome in Luxembourg corporation would have been pos
sible but US shareholders would have had to consider the
implications of personal holding company tax, tax on
foreign personal holding company income and section 1 2
o f the Revenue Act of 1 962 i f the stock o f the
Luxembourg corporation were closely held by US share
holders. Even if the stock were widely held, a foreign
corporation with US citizens as shareholders which had
US source income would have been technically subject to
accumulated earnings tax in the United States although
the likel ihood of collecting such a tax seemed remote.

If 25 percent or more of the capital of a company which
is a resident of a Contracting State (e.&, Luxembourg)
is owned directly or indirectly by individuals who are
not residents of that State (Luxembourg), and if by
reason of special measures the tax imposed by that
State (Luxembourg) on that company with respect to
dividends , interest or royalties arising in the other
Contracting State (e.g . , United States) is substantially
less than the tax generally imposed by the first-men
tioned State (Ltncembourg) on corporate business prof
its, then notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 10,
1 1 or 1 2 , that other State (United States) may tax such
dividends, interest or royalties.
According to Surrey, the theoretical j ustification behi nd
such provisions was that if preferential measures substan
tially mitigate taxation by the State of residence, e.g.,
Luxembourg Law of 31 July 1 929, and Decree Law of
27 December 1 93 7, then there is little danger of double
taxation, and cession by the United States, as a source
country, of its right to tax is not appropriate.
A memorandum to the attention of Mr Surrey, The
Secretary, Mr Deming, and Mr Knowlton, dated 5
December 1 966 , about the establishment of a new
Luxembourg Investment Fund briefly describes a situation
behind the denial of treaty benefits under Article XV of
the 1 962 with Luxembourg;
Michael Belmont, a member of the British firm
Cazenave & Co., told me Friday that his firm , together
with another British firm, are acting as managers in the
formation of a Luxembourg Investment Fund. This
Fund, which will be open only to non-Americans,
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will i nvest exclusively in US securities. The United
States Trust Company will be the investment advisor.
The i nitial offering is for $20 million and it will
operate as a closed•end Fund. If all goes well, the
capitalization will be i ncreased. The shares of the
mutual fund wi ll be quoted on European exchanges.
Shares may be redeemed at net asset value. The Fund
will concentrate on capital appreciation .

in the final protocol to the tax convention concluded with
Luxembourg in 1958:
The Convent ion shall not apply to holding companies
withi n the meaning of the special Luxembourg laws
(currently the Acts of July 3 1 , 1929 and December 27,
1 937). Neither shall it apply to income derived from
such holding companies by a resident of the Federal
Republic of Germany or to share in such companies
belonging to such persons.

Incidentally, under our treaty with Luxembou rg the
withholding tax on dividends will be at 30 percent
rather than the reduced rate otherwise apPlicable to

At the domestic level, while the 1 962 treaty with
Luxembourg gave birth to the principle that international
i ncome should pay tax at least once, early instances can be
found in the subject to tax clauses of the treaties with
United Kingdom , I reland, Australia, and Pakistan as
well as in Article 18 of the 1 95 5 treaty with Italy accord
ing to which:

Luxembourg, since Luxembourg will not tax the
income. Our income tax will not be an adverse factor.
The shareholders in the Luxembourg Fund will, of
course, not be subject to US tax. The capital gains of
the Fund will not be taxable in the US.

The issue was whether it was appropriate to grant treaty
benefits to a Luxembourg Investment Fund which
i nvested exclusively in US securities and by virtue of
Luxembourg domestic law was not subject to tax on i ts
US source income in case where the Fund was owned to a
substantial extent by third-country residents, i.e., persons
not entitled to the benefits of the US-Luxembourg tax
treaty. It is our opinion that for Surrey & co. it was
i nappropriate for the United States to forego its taxing
j urisdiction in such case.
Interestingly, the US official explanation proposed by
the US Treasury Department stared that although the
preferential tax treatment approach was not found in any
i ncome tax convention concluded by the United
States . . . certain precedent may be found in some of the
relief provisions contained in the conventions with the
United Ki ngdom, Ireland, Australia, and Pakistan requir
ing chat the recipient of treaty income 'be subject to tax'
on such i ncome in the country of residence in order to
qualify for exemption from , or reduction in the rate of, the
tax of the country of source. The US official explanation
also stated that Article XV was consistent with the spirit
of the provisions of section 12 of the Revenue Act of 1 962
relating to the taxation of certain 'tax-haven' income of
controlled foreign corporations ('CFCs') to US share
holders. In our opinion , this last sentence is a dear and
unden iable indication that Surrey wanted to close the
loopholes of US international tax rules by adopting both
a top-down (introducing Subpart F legislation dealing
with the issue of base companies from the perspective of
residence country) and a bottom-up approach (introducing
Limitation on Benefits ('LOBs') provisions dealing with
the issue of conduit companies from the perspective of
source country).
To be intellectually honest, however, Surrey was not
the first one at the international level who adopted a
preferential tax treatment approach dealing with the
issue of conduit companies. Indeed, such approach had
already been adopted by the Federal Republic of Germany

Each country may collect taxes governed by the con
ventions which are applied in the other country, in such
a manner as to prevent exemptions and reductions of
rates granted by the other country under the treaty
from benefitti ng persons who are nor entitled to them.

3

N ETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Si milar language ro Article XV of the 1 962 treaty with
Luxembourg appears in the 1 963 protocol ro rhe treaty
wi th the Netherlands appl icable to the Netherlands
Antilles. See Article I paragraph 1 of the Protocol to the
1 948 Treaty ( 1 963) wi th the Netherlands:
Articles VII, VIII, and IX of the Convention shall not
apply to income derived from sources within the
United States by any investment or holding company,
corporation, limited partnership or other entity entitled
to any of the special tax benefits provided under
Article 1 3 , Article 1 4 , or Article 14A of the
Netherlands Antilles' National Ordinance on Profit
Tax of 1940, as in effect on 1 September 1 963 , or to
substantially similar tax benefits granted under any
law of the Netherlands Antilles enacted after such date.
However, the scope of the Antilles provision was lim
ited by an agreement that an Antilles company could
entitle itself to treaty benefits by electing to be subject
to a low 1 5 % tax at residence, or if the Antilles company
owned 2 5 % of the US payor, See Article I paragraph 2 of
the Protocol to the 1948 Treaty ( 1 963) with the
Netherlands:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of the
present Article, Articles VII, VIII and IX of the
Convention shall continue to apply to dividends, inter
est, and royal ties derived by any entity , to which the
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provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article would other
wise apply, if either

i nvestment companies, Netherlands Antilles law guaran
teed that this reduced rate would not have been increased
prior to 1 968. A non-resident shareholder of an invest
ment company did not pay any Netherlands Antilles tax
on his dividends from the investment company.
As a result of this favourable tax atmosphere, indivi
duals residi ng in countries which did not have income tax
conventions with the United States had been forming
investment companies in the Netherlands Antilles to
hold their US investment and to collect dividends, inter
est and royalties from US sources on their behalf. As of 1

{a) the payer of such income is a United States corpora
tion (other than a United States corporation, 60 percent
or more of the gross i ncome of which is derived from
interest except to the extent derived by a corporation
the principal business of which is the making of loans ,
dividends, royalties, rents from real property, or gain
from the sale or other dispos ition of stock, securi ties, or
real property) , 25 percent or more of the stock of which
is owned by such entity ; or

January 1962, there were 901 nonresident-owned
investment companies incorporated in the Netherlands
Antilles. The extent to which the bilateral tax treaty had

(b) all of the stock of such entity is owned
(i) solely by one more individual residents of the
Netherlands Antilles in their individual capacities,

been utilized by residents of third countries to invest in
the United States had not been intended by the Treasury
when coverage under the tax convention had been
extended in 1 9 5 5 to the Netherlands Antilles. In addi
tion, the possibility that the United States m ight have
been indirectly encouragi ng Latin Americans co hold US
investments in this manner in conflict with the goals of
the Alliance for Progress program had to be considered. 2
It was for these reasons that the Treasury i nitiated discus
sions with representatives of the Netherlands and the
Netherlands Antilles during the spring of 1 962 regarding
the continued extension of the tax convention to the
Netherlands Antilles.
When it had been announced that these discussions
would have taken place, Mr Angulo3 and several other
attorneys representing Netherlands Antilles investment
companies and a few US banks advised the Treasury of
their belief that a termination of the tax treaty relation•
sh ip with the Netherlands Antilles might have resulted in
substantial liquidations of US investments held by
Netherlands Antilles companies which in turn could
have caused adverse balance-of-payments repercussions
4
for rhe United States.

(ii) solely by one or more i ndividual residents of the
Netherlands in their i ndividual capacities, or
(ii i) solely by one or more corporations of the Netherlands.
A memorandum from Surrey, attached to a letter that
Doug las D illon sent on 19 September 1 962, to the
Honourable J .W. Fulbr ight, Chairman of the
Committee o n Foreig n Relations United States
Senate, g ives us some of t he background whic h led
up to the negotiations for revisions 10 the US
Netherlands i ncome tax convention as it applies tO
the Netherlands Ant illes .
In the seven years between 1 9 5 5 and 1 962 , the
Netherlands A ntilles had earned a widespread reputation
as a ' tax haven', with laws specially designed to take full
advantage of the treaty relationship with the United
Scates. An investment company formed in the
Netherlands Antilles was then taxed at a maximum rate
of 3 % on its dividend, interest and royalty income from
foreig n sources , a 90-percent reduction in the corporate
tax races applicable to a Netherlands Antilles operating
company . As an i nducement to the formation of

Mi◄
2

'

Stt leu:er from Surrey to Honourable Jacob K. Javits Unlttd Stares Senate dared 8 June l 962� ar t � 'I recognize that there is a desir� on the pan of s.omt La.tin American$ rn
seek safety for rhe-ir capirnl from political and economk instabiHcy ;ind rherefore rhey invesc capita] ourside [be!r own (oumries. Nev.ff'th1l1.t1t in 11iew of Om' ,;.bjr.-tit't 1mdw th,;,
Alliance for Progtt1s. it inro-mh1et1t j1Jr tht United State1 to giw eiw tht (1p/Jf..2r41n� of uimJJ/ating an om.flow !if capit.:1! from Wein Amwi,a to the United States through a tax inJr,mnenl
granted by u1ay 6{a ronvmti,.m u.-itb the Netherlands AntiJ/n. Even if cerminacion of the convention would not add to the volume of inv-estmenr in I.ado A.merka, it might s.dU be
judicious to t-erminace it and avoid criticism from Lacin Amecican countries·.
Charles Angulo was born 4 Nov. 1 890, in Ha.ana, Cuba. He earned hi• A.B. from Georgemwn University in !91 l. He grodua,ed from Columbia Law School in 1914 and
immediately aft« became an associate at ,he New York law firm of Geller, Ralston & Blanc, later to betome Angulo, Cooney, Marsh & Ouchterleney. In 1960, Mr Angulo
became special counsel co the New York law firm ofDebevoise & Plimpwn flk/a Debevoise. Plimpcon, & McLean. He retired from the active prm:tke of iaw in 1 964, and his:
home in Char!o«esville, Va. where he pos,ed away on l l Jan. 1 972 at rhe age of 81 . S,e hups:l/www.nydmes.coml l97210lll l/archiveslcharles-angulo-8l-lawyer-since-i914.
html.
See memo<andum from McGreevy to Surrey, Mr Gordon and Mc Hafley re the Ne,hedands Amille> da,ed 6 June 1 962, ac !: 'On 5 June 1962 Mr Gordon and Mr McGneevy
met with the foHowfng individuals ro com:inue discussions of the extension of the Netherlands rax -convtntion to the Ntthedands AnciHes: (1) Charles Angulo - Specfal
Counsel, Debevoise, Plimpton & Mclean (NY); al,o representing Netherlands Antill°' Mutulll Funds NV (The Firs< Nacional City Trust Co.); (2) Kenneth W.
Bergen - Bingham, Dana &: Gould (Bos.mn) rep-resenring Old Colony Trust Co. .. Investment advi:s.o-r in US to Bankers Internacional Inves.tmem Co. :NV; CU Edwatd. .M.
de Camo - Emme<, Marvin & Martin (NY); also representing FahneStock & Co. and Bank of New York; (4) William G. Kaelin - Kramer, Marx, Greenlee & Backus; also
representing American [nvestment Trust NV; and (5) Phillip S. Trenborh - Schroder Trust Co� also inve:Stment advisor ta American fovestmeor Trust NV. The meeting
lllSted :approximately rwo honrs: and che major portion of the meeting was devoted to a rehash of the balance of payment arguments made at rhe conference of 10 May which
were summadzed in a memorandum from McGreevy dated t 1 May and in a memorandwn submiued by Mt Angulo on 28 May 1962'.Su Memorandum 118 ro Adverse Effect
on ouc Balance�of-Payments Deficit of Terminating our Income Tax Treaty with the Netherlands AntiU�r. submitted by Charles Angulo on 28 May 1962 at S: • It has
been estimated ,ha, Netherlands Antilles inves,menc companie• today hold between USD 500,000,000 and USO 750,000,000 of U.S. dollar secmicies . • . Let us take the
mean of these two figures ) namely, USD 625,000,000. as being rhe present tocal holdings in American securities of Nethetlands Anrilles invesc.ment companies, Therefore 1
upon che caacellarion of the Treaty with the Ntthe-dimds Antilles. tliese Ne:theclands Anrilles investment -companies, in ocder to avoid che impacr of Section 86l(a){2)(B) and
[hus to avoid the second tax mentioned above, wilt have to shfft more chan USD 300,000,000 from Americim investments to foreign investments. Thus che baian,e.of•
paymenu defidt which our Secretary of the Treasury sought co reduce at the bankers' meeting in Rome by USD 150,000�000 would be increased by over twice chat amount
n•
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Several conferences were held to explore that contention
and it was established that their primary concern regard
i ng termination of the tax convention as extended to the
Netherlands Antilles was the possible elimination of
Article XII of the convention because of section 86 1(a)
(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 86 l (a)(2XB) of the Code provided that a pro
portionate part of a dividend from a foreign corporation
which derived more than 50% of its gross i ncome from
US sources was also income from US sources. Article XII
of the convention rendered this provision of the Code
i neffective for foreign shareholders by providing that the
United States should have not taxed dividends from a
Netherlands Antilles corporation unless the recipient
were a citizen, resident or corporation of the United
States. The Angulo group maintained that, without the
insulation from US tax provided by Article XII, a
Netherlands Antilles investment company which derived
more than 50% of its gross income from US sources
would have been forced to liquidate a portion of its
investments in the United States to avoid the threat of a
second US tax of 30% on dividend which it paid to its
shareholders.
The amount of US investments which allegedly would
have been liquidated and reinvested elsewhere to escape
this result was estimated to he between USD 250 and
USD 300 million. As Mr Angulo i ndicated in his mem
orandum , the sole basis for this estimate was a report that
the investment companies held US investments valued at
more than USD 500 million. The source of the report was
the Tax Department of the Netherlands Antilles govern
ment which calculated the total from tax returns filed in
the Netherlands Antilles by all non-resident-owned
i nvestment companies for the year 1 960. Mr Angulo
arbitrarily l iquidated one-half of this total to reach his
estimate. However, as argued by Surrey, it was somewhat
misleading to assume, as Mr Angulo did, that more than
50% of these US inves tments would have been liquidated
and reinvested in other countries in order to avoid a
second US tax on dividends paid by a Netherlands
Antilles company to its shareholders. Such an estimate
ignored ( 1 ) investments which the Netherlands Antilles
company might already have had outside of the United
States and, more important , (2) disregarded the fact that
section 86l (a)(2XB) of the Code applied only to a foreig n
corporation which received a t least 50% o f its gross
income from US sources. 5 According to Surrey, the value

of the assets held in the United States was not really
pertinent to this issue. 6
Nevertheless, at the Treasury's request, the Netherlands
Antilles government provided additional computations
which had been compiled from the tax returns of the
investment companies. The Netherlands Antilles invest
ment companies reported worldwide investments valued
at USD 918 million for the year 1 960. Of this amount,
USD 5 74 million 01· 62,52 percent represented invest•
ments in the United States and USD 344 million or
3 7,47 percent represented investments in other countries. 7
According to Surrey, on the basis of these figures, a shift of
USD 1 1 6 million, and not of USD 300 m illion, invested in
US securities to investments outside of the United States
would have been required to produce in the aggregate the
balanced investment portfolios which Mr Angulo claimed
would have been needed.
The significant comparison for purposes of section 861
(a)(2)(B) of the Code was the ratio of gross i ncome from
US sources to gross from non-US sources. The compila
tions of the Netherlands Antil les government indicated
that the investment companies reported for 1960 gross
income from US sources of USD 24 million and net
income after US withholding of USD 23 million. Gross
income from sources outside of the United Stares was not
reported but net i ncome was USD 19 million. Inasmuch
as the Netherlands Antilles had only one other income tax
treaty , that with the United Kingdom, it could have been
assumed that the percentage of tax withheld on non-US
source income had been at least as severe as US with
holding. Moreover, subsequent discussions regardi ng
these computations with representatives of the
Netherlands Antilles government established that their
figures for US source i ncome of the investment compa
nies included substantial amounts which would not have
been regarded as US source i ncome. The Treasury's ana
lysis of all of the latest statistical data available indicated
that the gross i ncome from US sources of the
Netherlands Antilles investment companies was approxi
mately one-half of the gross income of these companies
from all sources. It was recognized that this ratio might
not have held constant from company to company and
that there might have been a potential threat of second
ary tax liability in specific instances if the extension of
the tax convention had been terminated. However,
according to Surrey, it seemed demonstrably clear that
the substantial liquidation of US investments envisioned

WWW

by virtue- of his purely voluntary an-d .avoidable action in canc;-eH:ng the said Netherlands AnciUes Treacy' .Su al1a memorandum from Mr McGreevy re Effect on US Balance of
Payments if Extension of US-Nerhedands Tax: Convention to the Netherlands Antilies is terminated da.ted t l May 1 962.

'

Se, memorandum from Mr McGreevy co Surrey re che Netherlands Antilles dated l 5 June 1962, at 8.

6

Su memorandum from Mr McGr-tevy co Surrey re che Netherlands Amines dated 1 8 Jnne 1962, ac 1: 'the value of the underlying assers of the invesrmem companies is nae

really macerial in derermining whether tecminacion of the treaty extension would force the investment companies to l iquidate- part of their US investments to avoid a
secondary US tax on their sha[eholders. The lia;bilicy of shareholders of a foreign corporation for thi-s secondary tax depends on whether 50 percent of its gross income is from
US ;1;ources. However, [he market value of any inves[ments whi{h might be ]iquidat�d and reinvested outside the Uni[ed States. is material from the standpoim of balance-of
payments repercussions'
r
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by Mr A ngulo as a necessary concom itance of term ina
t ion was not supported by objective evidence.
While the Treasury did not propose to terminate the
tax treaty relationship with the Netherlands Antilles,8 the
decision had been made to make formation of non-resi
dent-owned i nvestment companies in the Netherlands
Antilles to hold US i nvestments less attractive. Under
the agreement reached with representatives of the
Netherlands Antilles governmen t on 25 June 1 962 the
US tax rates on dividends, interest and royalties paid to
these companies would have been increased to 3 0% .9 This
is the same tax rare which is now imposed on these types
of income when paid to an investment company i ncorp o
rated in a country which does not have a tax treaty with
the United States . This rate also compared favourably to
the total tax burden on a d ividend from US sources paid
to an investment company incorporated in any other
country with which the United States had a tax treaty
because of the additional taxes which would have been
imposed by that country on the income of the company or
on the dividends it paid to its shareholders. No changes in
Article XII of the tax convention had been contemplated
so Mr Angulo's concern with respect to the applicability
of section 86l (a)(2 )(B) of the Code was relieved.
Surrey anticipated that the effect of this agreement
would have been to discourage considerably further incor
porations of non-resident-owned i nvestment companies in
the Netherlands Antilles to make investments in the
United States but that liquidations of US i nvestments
held by companies then in existence would have been

nominal since withholding rates of tax on dividend income
from most European countries were comparable to the
10
statutory rate imposed by the United States. Mr Angulo
and others who had originally opposed any changes in the
tax convention as applied to the Netherlands Antilles had
advised the Treasury that they would have j oined in these
conclusions. Similar opinions were also expressed by the
representatives of the Netherlands Antilles government.
Therefore, Surrey believed that the agreement reached in
J une of 1 962 to modify the tax convention as applied to the
Netherlands Antilles provided a satisfactory compromise to
11
a potentially difficult simacion.
The above archival research shows that during negotia
tions with representatives of the Netherlands and of the
Netherlands Antilles in March of 1962, the United States
indicated that it was considering exercise of the right under
Article XXVII(3) of the US-Netherlands i ncome tax con
vention to unilaterally terminate the territorial extension tO
the Netherlands Antilles. However, when it became pub
licly known that the United States were considering termi
nation of the extension , representatives of several New York
banks and i nvestment brokers requested a hearing to pre
sent their view that chis would have resulted in a substan
tial portion of the capital investment of the Netherlands
Antilles investment companies in the United States being
liquidated for reinvestment in other countries.
Interestingly, it should be noted that while, as argued
by Fishbien , seven internal Treasury Departmem reports
unequivocally support the notion that the idea behind
Subpart F was initially formed mainly due to rhe
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[n a memorandum co the- atremlon QfSurrey, dated 21 June 1962, Mt Gordon stated rhar termination of ch-e reduced races would, from the Uoited States point of view, have
had the foUowing consequences: (l) a revenue inccease, on the a.s:sumpdon thar no change were to be made in the volume of inves:rmt:ms in the United States by Nerherlands
AmiUes investment and holding compani-e:s., of about USD 4. l miUfon; (2} an indkacion of the seriousness with whic:b the Unfc-ed States considered the tax avoidance
problem and a d-f'monstration to ocher coum.ries of irs plan to elim�nate -existing tax avoidance opportunities; and {3) removal of possible grounds foe ,criticism b}· Larin
American counrri:es -char che United States was encouraging the- movemenr of capital from La.tin-America inro the Unired Srare.s.Se,a/Jo letter- from Surrey to Honourable
Jacob K. Javits. 1r1pr.,� n. 2, ar 4 ' . . . On tht othtr hand, for what it u tt;(JYlh l am lk-g inr1ing to reach a (f;nc/11sil.iJt for thi firn time that a ltnnination oftAis extmsfon u.,1;n/J han ,m
immediate adwrse. eff«-t !}n Qtfl' h11l.ance efpay111m11. FtJr thiJ rra1tm urtd beattJt thffe It<'!m TY be a duirt in the Ntrberfands Antilles tt;J Tndint,1in tht exJe,i.rion fiJ'r le:gilimate purprm·J, I tuJ-tdd
m'gt rwision rathr.r th.an te-miinatirm of thi rx1en1i1»i ifal all ptmihle /;-om u p;;luy t,impoint' .See also memorandum from Mr McGreevy to Surrt:y1 Mr Gordon and Mr Harley re The
Netherland Antilles and The Netherlands Tax Convention dared 1 June 1962, at 1 : · . , . It apf>tat-1 N./iUJ • • • that -uepyvbably u'ill '1()t tmninate in virw rJ/ o12 cht1nge in p-o;itwri o-n th-r
bahnc, of paymm/J ism«om;y,d by Mr B,,.g,n •• !,,half •f th, gw,p ,., ""' wi,h •• May 1(,'.
In • memotandum co ,he Sec«tary dam! 30 Aug. 1962, Surrey s,ar,d trui, the modifications agieed upon were actually ptoposed by Mr Angulo who main,ained rhar no
balance-of-payments repercussions would foHow.See ahtJ letter from Surrey to Honourable Jacob K. Javirs.. iupra n, 2. at 3: 'W; JJfsq discussed hriefly tht mggestfon. first madt by
M, Bergen am/ h,,., tmdmd by Mr Angi,Jo,
rhii gro11p might fiml palatabl, 30 pe,-,em u,ithholding •• all panive incom, •fth, investrnmt ,ompani,1 ft•m rh, Uniud SJatt1 if Artie/, XII
ef the ((1ti'tlftltian, prtwiding insulati&r1 /mm a US s,mmdary tax, wi:rJ 'l'traind in f(Jfft. It seemed to be acceptable alrhough Mr. de Castro thought 27 pet-cent more equitable in view
of the tax burden on a Canadian NRO corporation and Mr. Tcenboch. who did not seem at aU surpri-sed, said this was a new proposal to him and he would have 10 think
about it. Mr. Gr:wdo-n madt. i1 dear, hmL'mT, that this u:as tb&ir proposal and m,J Treaiurt/s'.Set .a/Jo memorandum from Mr McGreevy co Surrey. Mr Gordon and Mr Harley re The
Nethert.nd Antil!e, and The Netherlands Tax Convemion dated I June 1962, at 2: ' . . . On May 31 Mr. Bergm imlicaled 1hat he had ,onf.,,,.J with hi, co/lt,1g11e, am/ that th;-;
u1;uld nfil o!Jjea PJ an inrreme ir, rax rates applicable. t.a- Neth.erl,wd.5 Anti/Ju inl!e!tmmt compPnitr p/th9«gh there is tf.JJM miilantf! 10 thi 30 p#cmr rate. Mr. Angulo feels that the rate
should be 25 percent :so rhac it wauM not be more advantageous to use a Canadian NRO company, I re.minded Mr. Bergen of Canadian success Lon duties and ht agreed tha.t
this woutd be- an offsetting factor. Mr. Bergen does feel that the ulrfma!Ce r:ax burden on a shareholder of an investment company in the- Netherlands Antilles. should noc be
hi8her than in any other tteaty country if r.h-ey are to have success selHng their mumal fund shares. He inquired :11bouc the Swiss siruacion and I explained that the porenttal
tax burden seemed much heavier on a Swiss tnvestmem: company but that we did nor know what arrangements might be possible at rhe, adminis:rrative level. He does not
know eich,r and I suggested that any information which his group could supply along these lines would be· helpful'.
w See letter from Surrey to Honourable Jacob K. Javits, mpra n. 2� at 6. McGreevy thought that it was unreasonable co assume thac a tax rate in-crease alone would have
prompted a substantial liquidation of these Investments. Withholding rates in Europe gem:raHy app-roached the 30% statu.toty rare applicable in rhe, United States on
di-vidends. Other facmr:s such as stabEHt:y. growth p oremial and marketability of equity secutide-s musr be considered. If US corporate stocks no longer offered advantages
when measured by these factors. then some liquidations must be expectedT But the -cause would nor have- been an increase in the rate of US tax on dividends alone.
11
S.et memorandum from Mr McGreevy tO Sut(ef> Mr Gordon and Mr Harley re the Netherland Anrilles and rhe Netherlands Tax Convention dated 1 June- 1962, at 3 'lo the
e-veor rhac a decision is reached to revise rhe Nerhedands AmiUes ex:t-ens.fon t0 provide for incr�ed tax rar-es 0-a passive income of inv-estmenc companies, thi:S- probably
should be discussed wi.rh representatives of the Netherlands- Amille-s pdor to June 30 and perhaps an informal agreement reached. It seems almost ceruin thar such a
compromise would be accep[able as an alternative to termination. As a matttr offact., d,1rh1g tk nfg.l)tiations with the D11tch which �fr van 'W.erk/,.J;ven affended, this wa1 tht solutit.m
which all undemood Wat p,ob,,bly rh, !mt we cor,/d offer',
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deteriorate US balance of payment position, 12 here, the
balance of payment atgumem was used by lobbyists to
stop Treasury from terminating the tax treat y relation•
ship with the Netherlands Antilles. We are not going to
arg ue whether Angulo group 's arguments made sense
economically . However, we just wanted to note that
the US-Netherlands Antilles Treaty was eventually ter
minated in 1 987 and during these twent y-four years
taxpayers had enough time to relocate their investment
and holding companies in more favourable tax
j urisdictions.
4

been taken to close a tax loophole arising out of a combi
nation of Canadian law and the United States - Canadian
income tax treaty.
Under that treaty, a reduced US withholding tax
applied to income paid to a corporation created under
the laws of Canada. However, under Canadian law no
tax was imposed on a company created in Canada if it
was managed and controlled abroad. It appeared to Surrey
that such com panies were then being org anized with
management and control in Bermuda, the Bahamas and
other tax haven countries that levied no tax on a company
that was manag ed and controlled there. The result was
that third-country nationals were beginning ro take
advantage of a loophole similar to that of the
Netherlands Antilles.
Surrey was indicating that they had discussed the pro
blem with the Canadians and received a positive initial
reaction for doing something. But in order to obtain a
firmer commitment, they ag reed to prepare a press release
which the US Embassy in Ottawa would have cleared with
the Canadians before they issued it. Surrey also stated that
they had left open the possibility of having the tax loop
hole closed by unilateral Canadian action, since revision of
the tax treaty might have been too time-consuming.
Surrey concluded the memorandum by stating that the
matter had been called to his attention by a group of
practitioners which had been planning ro form such a
Canadian corporation. The group stated that publication
of the press release would have probably ended their plans.
The g roup also thought that there had been some Curacao
corporations which had been thinking of shifting to
Canada if the Treasury had not taken action of the kind
contem plated in the press release.
Conse q uently , on 1 3 April 1 96 5, the Treasury pub
lished the following press release titled United States to
Act Ag ainst Tax Avoidance under Canadian Tax Treaty:

CANADA

Here, a review of Surrey's Papers on the tax treaty with
Canada from 1 964 to 1 965 shows an interesting letter
that Surrey had sent to Marshall J. Langer 1 3 on 27
February 1 965. Surrey acknowledged receipt of Langer's
letter of 8 February 1 965 enclosing a copy of a req uest for
ruling submitted to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Surrey stated that he was quite interested in
Langer's request and wanted to let Langer know that if
and when the Treasury would have discussed with the
Canadian Government changes in the convention between
the United States and Canada, US Treasury would have
requested Canada to amend Article XI of that convention
so as to make its benefits available Qnly /Q resident
Canadian cmpQratiQns.
We were nor able to locate neither Langer's letter to
Surrey of 8 February 1965 nor copy of a req uest for ruling
that Langer submitted to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and attached to his letter to Surrey . Previous
papers show that on 26 February 1 965 Mr Loengard and
Surrey discussed Langer's letter of 8 February 1965
whereby Mr Loeng ard stated that Canada did not have
any discretion as far as he knew; i.e., they could not levy a
tax on a non-resident company. In addition, according to
Mr Loengard, neither the United States had discretion
under the treaty to levy a withholding tax on payments
made to a non-resident Canadian company. Finally, Mr
Loengard concl uded his letter to Surrey stating that it was
Nate (Gordon?)'s opinion to only take this matter up with
Canada when the Treasury was ready to renegotiate the
treat y generall y .
A couple of weeks later, on 1 7 March 196 5 , Surrey sent
to the Secretary a memorandum attaching a proposed
press release announcing that action would have soon

Action will soon be initiated by the United States to
tighten the tax rules that apply to income flowing
between the United States and Canada so as to elim•
inate a tax avoidance device which now permits people
living outside both countries to receive investment
income from the United States at substantially reduced
tax rates, rhe Treasury Department announced roday.
This unintended tax preference results from the inter
action of existing Canadian law and the provisions of
the existing tax treaty between the United Stares and
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:t2 N. Fil;hbien. Fn,m Switzerland u_,ilh Lon: Snrrey".s PapM"s and the Original lnttm(s) of Stthparl-F (20 ]um 2018) > 38{10) Va. Tax Rev. t (2018).
" Marshall J. I.anger was born on 30 May 1928 in Brooklyn, New York. He was ,he only ,on of Edna and Samuel Lanser. He gcaduated from the University of Miami I.aw
School .mmma mm laude in 19-S l and pranked law for many years in Somh Florida and imemationall y. Among many publications., he co-authored mgether Edward J. Smith
the leading treatise on Pracckal Jnrernat.ional Planning in Dec. of 2000t which ts currend y ar in fourth edition. Relevant to our discussion is his M. J. Lmgert Tax Trtatfo
Crearing Tax H.flwn Sit11.ati;;m� Tax Notes Federa (6 On:. 1980). In char article, Langer analysed the fonots that make specific tax tre3ties particularly susceptible to tax haven
manipulations. He used the i:nc-ame- tax treaty between the Unlted States .and the Necherland-s AntiBes as his principal example. He then turned m an analysls of the US
e.ffons to de-al with the question of treaty shopping, He concluded by sugge;i;ting that the US positJon with respect to ueary shopping has not always been <onsistent. and
that ueaty shopping would have continued untH effective act�on is taken ro uop jt_
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Canada. The treaty provides that a company organized
in Canada and receiving investment income from the
United States is subject to a 15 percent US withholding
tax on such income rather than the usual 30 percent.
However, Canadian law provides that a company orga
nized under Canadian law but deriving its income from
outside Canada shall be exempt from Canadian taxes if
the company is managed and controlled outside
Canada. The combination of these provisions makes it
possible for such a Canadian company to be used by
third country residents as a device to avoid US taxes.

every year from 1965 on, would ha-ve not been treated
as a Canadian resident company. If it became residenr
in 1965, or in any later year it would have continued to be
treated as a resident company in all years subsequent to
that year. In other words, the Canadian domestic law
would have exempted a Canadian company from tax on
income originating outside Canada if the company had
been incorporated before 26 April 1965, and had not been
a resident corporation in any year ending after that date.
According to Gordon, the unintentional result had been
to allow such a Canadian company to be used by third
country residents as a device to avoid US taxes. Therefore,
Treasury considered a supplementary tax convention
designed to remove this unintended tax benefit. On 25
October 1966, a new paragraph 6 was added to Article XI
of the US-Canada Income Tax Treaty of 1942:

A holding company, a mutual investment fund, or a
similar investment company created under Canadian
law but managed and controlled in a "tax haven"
country may be used to make investments in the
United States by people living in countries that have
no tax treaty with the United States. Such people can
derive investment income subject only to a 15 percent
withholding tax in the United States and to no tax
whatsoever in either Canada or their home country.

Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply in respect of
income derived from sources in one of the Contracting
States and paid to a corporation organized under the
laws of the other Contracting State if such corporation
is not subject to tax by the last-mentioned Contracting
State on that income because it is not a resident of the
last-mentioned Contracting State for purposes of its
income tax.

A modification of the income tax treaty between the
United States and the Netherlands last year led to
elimination of the Netherlands Antilles as a place
through which third country residents could similarly
avoid taxes on investment income. As a result Canadian
corporations may now be in the process of being estab
lished for the same purpose.

5

It is anticipated that discussions will be held soon with
the Canadian authorities to consider appropriate mea
sures to eliminate the tax avoidance described.

Oeco

As mentioned above, Surrey's ideas were not only implemen
ted at the domestic level within the treaties that he and his
squad negotiated with foreign counterparts. His ideas had
also a huge impact at the OECD level. Indeed, it was during
Surrey's time at the US Treasury Department that the US
Delegation wrote two notes to the OECD Fiscal Committee
recommending the establishment of a new Working Group
which would address the problem ofTax Avoidance through
the improper use or Abuse of tax Conventions. In a note
written on 14 November 1961, it was stated that:

Meanwhile, on the other side of the border, the Canadian
government had already taken steps to do its own plug
ging of this loophole. The fiscal 1966 budget submitted
to Parliament by Finance Minister Walter Gordon con
tained a provision for taxing corporations which incorpo
rated in Canada and then moved their headquarters
outside the country. If this provision had been adopted,
such corporations would have, in the future, been consid
ered resident in Canada for purposes of Canadian tax.
An undated memorandum from Mr Gordon to Surrey
and Mr Loengard clarified the Canadian budget proposal.
According to Mr Gordon, the proposed change in the
definition of a Canadian resident corporation to include
all companies incorporated in Canada, whether or not
their managemenr and control was in Canada, would
have applied to all companies incorporated in Canada
after 26 April 1965. Those companies incorporated in
Canada prior to that dare, which were managed or con
trolled outside Canada, would, in the future, have been
treated as Canada only if they were actually residenr in
Canada during the taxable year which included 26 April
1965, or if they became resident during any year subse
quent to this year. Thus a mmpany which was incorpo

In recent years there has developed a problem of tax
avoidance and evasion to which it would be appropriate
for the Fiscal Committee to address itself. This pro
blem involves the exploitation of tax conventions
in a manner which is unnecessary for the avoid
ance of double taxation and which provides unin
tended benefits to taxpayers. For example, an
enterprise of one contracting country may establish a
corporate subsidiary in the other contracting country
principally for the purpose of taking advantage of the
interaction of domestic tax statutes and an income tax
convention between the two countries in such a way as
to reduce the aggregate of taxes paid to a level below
that which would prevail if the activities were con
ducted entirely in either one of the countries party to
the convention. A further example is the establishment
of a similar subsidiary by an enterprise of a third state
in order to take advantage of the treaty between the

rated in Canada prior to 1865 and which continually
had its management and control outside Canada in
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Delegation . Accordin g to the draft terms of reference,
WP No. 2 1 was requested to consider whether, and to
what extent, tax avoidance problems have developed
through the abuse of tax conventions between member
countries and whether the benefits of a convention should
and can be denied to certain entities situated in the
territories of the signatories to a convention or in the
territories of third countries in order to prevent such
abuse. Mr Gordon, Mr Ross and Mr Beinert were repre
sentatives of the US delegation (Rapporteur of WP No.
2 1) together with delegates of Denmark.
Here a review of Surrey's Papers shows a report from
Surrey to William T. Wolfe dated 27 November 1 961
whereby Surrey stated that:

two contracting states . . . It is the view of the United
States Delegation that income tax conventions
should be so constructed that they cannot be
availed of to avoid legitimate tax burdens, that
artificial transactions and business structures
entered into or established to avoid legitimate tax
burdens should be discouraged and prevented, and
that international co-operation to this end is possi
ble and necessary. 14
The establishment of a Working Party was further recom
mended by the United Stares Delegation in a second note
of 4 January 1 962 , where it was stated that:
Developments in recent years, however, suggest
that income tax conventions must also deal with
the problem of legal avoidance of tax achieved
through what many regard as abuse of tax: conven
tions. The experience of the United Stares , as well as of
other countries, has shown that in many cases che taX
conventions have been employed for purposes other than
the intended objective of elim inating double taxation,
and have served as a means by which taxpayers avoid
their proper rax burdens. Through the establishment
of related corporations in several countries, often
for no purpose other than the anticipated tax ben
efits, taxpayers in treaty countries have taken advan
tage of international tax agreements and the
interaction between such agreements and internal
laws so as to subject their total profits to taxes far
below those imposed on purely domestic enter
prises in any one of the countries in which these
inter-related companies are created. Moreover, resi
dents of non-treaty countries have been able to
obtain the benefits of the conventions between
two treacy countries by forming corporate entities
in one or more treacy countries for the sole purpose
of obtaining such treaty benefits. In both types of
cases, benefits are obtained which were never intended
by the Contracting States when the tax conventions were
negotiated. The tax avoidance achieved in this man
ner, legal though it may be, may have serious reper
cussions. Not only are Governments denied
legitimate revenues and inequities created among
taxpayers similarly situated, but significant distor
tions may result in the international allocation of
resources. 1 �

The Treasury also participated in a meeting of the
Fiscal Committee of the OECD and put forward a
proposal for the creation of a working group that
would examine the tax laws of Member countries !!!.

ascertain to u1hat extent they operate, in coniunction
with tax treaties, to Provide unintended tax benefits
and to Promote tax avoidance. The working group
would also be charged with developing draft Provi
sions for inclusion in tax conventions which would
Preclude such tax benefits. While sentiment in the
Fiscal Committee seemed to favor such a working
group, action on its establishment was deferred until
the January meeting, by which time the United States
delegation will have circulated a proposal reflecting the
views expressed at the November meeting.

Of course the views of the US delegation were opposed by
the Swiss delegation. From the report on meeting of the
OECD Fiscal Committee which was held on 22-25
January 1962 it emerged that it was unnecessary for the
Swiss delegation to adopt a special treaty article dealing
with abuse of tax conventions. The Swiss delegation noted
that Switzerland had modified its tax regulations to pre
vent abuse of Swiss tax conventions. After an animated
exposition of the virtues of Switzerland as a financial,
geographic and economic centre for international enter
prises, and the reasonable level of taxation, the Swiss
delegation stared that chey did feel that their tax treaties
were sometimes used co the advantage of persons not
entitled to them and chat this was outside the spirit of
its tax treaties. Under the new regulations, a foreign
owned Swiss company deriving the bulk of its income
abroad which paid out more than half its gross income co
foreign enterprises in the form of deductible items, such
as interest, royalties and fees, would have been considered

WP No. 2 1 on Tax Avoidance was thus created two weeks
later on 1 7 January 1 962 after solicitation by the US

&Mi◄
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OECD Fiscal Commiuee, Nott !Jy tht United Stt111J Del,gaf1(},i OR Ta AtJOitlanfl Thr9ugh the Improper Use w .t\/;ust q/ Tax Cfmvmriom ( 1 4 Nov� 1 961)1 TFD/FC/135, http:l!www.
r.axtreadeshistory.orgl,

" OECD Fiscal Committtt, No1, bJ 1/,e Uniled Statu Dd,gotion •• Tax Atmi,1,,111:, 1h,1111gh th, Improper Us, or ADIi.re r,/ To,c c..,_,;,,,,, (4 Jan. 1962), TFDIFC/136, http://www.
taxrreati<:shistory.o<sf.
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to be misusing the Swiss conventions. This provmon
reflected in part the fact that some Swiss tax-haven com
pan ies had been paying out virtually all their income as
cost items to other related companies in Monaco,
Liechtenstein, etc. In addi tion, foreign-owned companies
that did not pay out at least one-fourth of their profits as
dividends would also have been considered to be misusi ng
the tax conventions. The consequences of such a finding
were not made dear, but the Swiss delegation took the
posit ion that its unilateral action had ended the likelihood
of tax abuses in Switzerland .
Several delegations welcomed the Swiss action. The
Austrian and United States delegations expressed similar
views but noted that unilateral was insufficient to deal
with the problem . While the Swiss action might have
forced tax haven firms to distribute their profits,
Switzerland would have collected tax while other coun
tries which were signarories to tax conventions with
Swi tzerland would have given up revenues in cases
where they ought not tO.
It was also brought our to the attention of the
Com m i ttee that holding companies were not the only
medium for tax abuse, operating companies also posed a
real problem. The United States delegation gave examples
of sale companies , licensing companies and service com
panies in Switzerland engaged in active business activities
outside Swi tzerland . The German delegation pointed out
that the problems referred to exist independently of tax
treaties . However, the French delegation noted that Swiss
operating companies obtained a tax exemption in France
as a result of the tax treaty between the two countries, and
chat rax conventions were a major factor in the problem.
The Swiss opposition however did not prevent the US
and Danish delegation from preparing a draft memoran
dum which served as basis for the discussion of the
methods of preventing abuse of tax conventions. The
memorandum was originally drafted by the Danish dele
gation but extensively revised by the US delegation under
the supervision of Surrey on 14 December 1 962.

6

from tax (as happens under an exemption system if there is
16
In 1927, the first League of
no source country tax).
Nations model imposed a withholding tax on interest that
was refundable if the taxpayer could show that a tax had
been paid to the residence jurisdiction. At the same time the
commentary to the model explicitly endorsed the STP:
From the very outset, [the drafters of the model conven
tion] realized the necessity of dealing with the questions
of tax evasion and double taxation in co-ordination with
each other. It is highly desirable that States should come
to an agreement with a view to ensuring that a taxpayer
shall not be taxed on the same income by a number of
different countries, and it seems equally desirable that
such international cooperation should prevent certain
incomes from escaping taxation altogether. The most
elementary and undisputed principles of fiscal justice,
therefore, required that the experts should devise a scheme
17
whereby all incomes would be taxed once and only once.
However, these ideas took a long time to implement in
practice. The foreign tax credit only applied the STP to
outbound and not to inbound investment, and the com
bination with deferral meant that much of the foreign
source income of US multinationals was not currently
taxed. The interest provision from the 1 927 model was
never implemented.
Like the arm's-length principle which was invented in
the 1 930s but only fully implemented when the US
adopted the first detailed transfer prici ng regulations in
1 968, the STP was first implemented by the US under
Surrey's leadership. The first author has explained elsewhere
how Subpart F was des igned to apply the STP to outbound
transactions, because in 1 962 i ncome that was still eligible
for deferral under Subpart F was very unlikely not to be
18
subject to similar levels of source country taxation. In this
art icle, we show how Surrey applied the STP in practice to
inbound transactions and how he began pushing the OECD
in the same direction. This is rhe effort that ultimately bore
fruit in the original Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project and in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA),
which with all their flaws are direct attempts to implement
the STP. The current BEPS 2.0 project builds on this
disti nguished lineage. Thus, it can be said that while
Surrey did not i nvent the STP as a theoretical construct,
he was the first to i mplement it in practice, and all sub
sequent efforts to do so build on his pioneering work.

CONCLUSION

The origins of the STP can be traced back to the very
beginnings of the international tax regime. In 1 9 1 8, the
US adopted the foreign tax credit rather than an exemption
to relieve double taxation, and justified it in part by relying
on the idea that cross border income should not be exempted

16

ln justi fying the foreign tax credit , it-s architiecc T.S. Adams wrote that 'the state which with a fine regard for che righ-cs of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double taxation,
may fairly rake measures to ensure that the person oc property pays. at lease one rax '. T. S. Adams , lntmtau. and lnurna/ional D,;11/;/e Taxatfon, in Ltaum f)" Taxi11i,;n 1 0 1 1
l 1 2-1 1 3 (R. F. Magill, T. S, Adams et al. eds, Chicago Commerce clearing House 1932 ).

17
18

fO[ the his:co.ry of chis formulation see Mazzoni, supra n. l .
R. S . A,;. Yonah, All of a Piec, Thm11gho111; Th, F,11, A <1 of U.S. /Ntm,ational Ta><at;on, 25 (2) Va. Tax Rev. 3 1 3 (2005 }; R .S. Avi-Yonah & N. Fishbien , Once Mm, With
g
F,,/i11g: TRA / 7 and 1h, Origfoal Intent of Subpart F , 1 5 7 Tax Nom 959 ( 1 3 Nov, 201 7).
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